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Arbitration of 
Employment-discrimination 
Lawsuits:
Legalities, Practicalities, and Realities
Arbitration agreements can be an effective, cost-effective way to settle employment disputes—  
but not all courts agree about what constitutes an enforceable contract.
b y  DAVID SHERWYN
Pre-dispute m andatory arbitration of employment- related lawsuits is the centerpiece of numerous hospi­tality employers’ employee-relations programs. Com­
panies as diverse as Four Seasons, Darden Restaurants, and 
Waffle House have implemented such programs to avoid the 
time, expense, and ill will that are inherent in the litigation 
process. Employers who have im plem ented mandatory- 
arbitration policies proudly report that the programs have been 
successful from both the employers’ and employees’ perspec­
tives.1 Notwithstanding such positive reviews, academics, leg­
islators, and employee-rights advocates have made attacking 
mandatory arbitration a cottage industry. Even the popular 
press has come out against mandatory arbitration.
1 Interviews with in-house counsel for H alliburton and Darden Restau­
rants, and vice president o f hum an resources for Four Seasons.
In contrast, the courts have, for the most part, been friendly 
to mandatory arbitration even though the law of arbitration 
has been unsettled since 1991. In the last two years, however, 
there have been two U.S. Supreme Court and at least four 
circuit-court cases that have clarified the law and made it clear 
that employers can implement such policies as a term and 
condition of employment. The purpose of this article is to 
explain the law pertaining to mandatory arbitration. Before 
discussing arbitration’s legality, however, it is necessary to ex­
plain why a growing number of employers consider manda­
tory arbitration a sound policy.
Why Employers Choose Arbitration
The short answer to why employers seek arbitration is the 
cost of litigation. Employment-discrimination suits are a
©  2002, CORNELL UNIVERSITY
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growth industry in the United States. In 1989 
employees filed 63,898 discrimination claims 
with the EEOC; in 2001 employees filed 80,840 
discrimination charges, a 26-percent increase in 
10 years.2 Furthermore, those numbers under­
represent the actual number of discrimination 
claims, because employees file a similar number 
of claims with affiliated state and local agencies. 
It is not, however, the number of legitimate claims 
that trouble employers. Instead, it is the expense 
o f the process, the number of frivolous claims, 
and the perverse incentives inherent in this 
adjudication process that leads employers and 
employees alike to conclude that the system is 
broken.
To file a discrimination lawsuit, employees 
must first file a charge of discrimination with the 
EEOC or an affiliated state agency.3 The EEOC 
has almost always tried to convince the parties 
to settle. If the parties do not settle at its prompt­
ing, the EEOC investigates the claim and ren­
ders its opinion as to whether there is “reason­
able cause” to believe that the plaintiff has been 
discriminated against.4 Regardless o f whether the 
EEOC “finds cause,” the agency then issues a 
“right to sue” letter.5 This letter “allows” the plain­
tiff to file a claim in federal court. In an extraor­
dinarily small percentage of the cases filed, the 
EEOC decides that the issue is so important that 
the agency should litigate on the p lain tiff’s 
behalf.
2 See: “U.S. Equal Em ploym ent O pportun ity  C om m ’n, 
Enforcem ent Statistics FY 1986-1996 (May 1997)” and 
“U.S. Equal Em ploym ent O pportunity  Com m ’n, Enforce­
m ent Statistics FY 2001,” at www.eeoc.gov.
3 See: 29 U.S.C. § 626(d) (1994); and 42 U.S.C. § 2000e- 
5 (1994). Employees can elect to file with the federal, state, 
or local agency. In m ost circumstances, the agencies exer­
cise concurrent jurisdiction so that claims are cross-filed 
among each agency. In other circumstances, the local agency 
stands on its own so that employees can have their claims 
investigated  m ore th an  once. T h e C ity  o f  C hicago’s 
H um an Rights Law is an example o f the situation where 
an employee can pursue two claims simultaneously.
4 Id.
5 O ne commentator, Michael Selmi, notes that the EEO C 
often informs the p laintiff o f its intention to issue a no­
cause finding before doing so to afford the plaintiff an op­
portunity  to  request a right-to-sue notice. See: Michael 
Selmi, “The Value o f  the EEO C: Reexamining the Agency’s 
Role in Em ploym ent Discrim ination Law,” 57 Ohio St. L.J. 
1, 9 n .  35 (1996).
In the years 1992-2000, the EEOC resolved 
between 68,366 and 106,312 cases each year.6The 
EEOC classifies each resolved case as either (1) a 
merit resolution (i.e., a settlement, a withdrawal with 
benefits, or finding of “cause”) or (2) a non-merit 
resolution (“no cause” finding or administrative 
closing).7 With regard to merit resolutions during 
those years (’92 -’00), the parties settled or “with­
drew the case with benefits” in 7 percent to 13.2 
percent of the cases, while EEOC found cause in 
fewer than 9 percent of the remaining cases each 
year (and only 2.3 percent in at least one year).8 
O f the remaining non-merit resolutions, the EEOC 
found no reasonable cause in 48.1 percent to 61 
percent of the cases during those years, and admin­
istratively closed 20.5 percent to 36.3 percent of 
the cases.9 Overall non-merit resolutions comprised 
78.7 percent to 90.9 percent of the resolutions.10
I suggest three possible explanations for the large 
number of no-cause findings; (1) employees do not 
understand the law, (2) the EEOC is failing to find 
cause in cases with merit, or (3) employees are fil­
ing frivolous claims hoping for nuisance setdements 
(that is, being paid a setdement to close the case 
regardless of its merit).11 Even if each explanation 
accounts for a third of those cases closed adminis­
tratively or due to a no-cause finding, it would still 
mean that 26 percent to 30 percent of the cases 
filed in each of the last ten years were frivolous. In 
addition, discrimination investigators and defense 
lawyers contend that a substantial percentage of the 
merit resolutions include frivolous cases that were 
setded for nuisance values.12
6 U.S. Equal Em ployment O pportunity  Commission web 
site, http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/all.html (as viewed on Janu­
ary 13, 2002).
7 Id.
'I d .
9 Id
10 Id.
11 David Sherwyn, J. Bruce Tracey, and Zev J. Eigen, “In 
Defense o f  M andatory Arbitration o f  Em ploym ent Dis­
putes: Saving the Baby, Tossing O u t the Bath Water, and 
C onstructing a New Sink in  the Process,” University o f  
Pennsylvania Journal o f  Labor and  Employment Law, Vol. 2, 
No. 1 (Spring 1999), pp. 73-150.
12 The author bases this statem ent on his seven years o f 
experience as a management-side em ployment lawyer and 
on numerous conversations w ith other management-side 
lawyers, plaintiffs’ lawyers, and investigators.
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Frivolous claims do not just injure law- 
abiding employers. An abundance of frivolous 
claims burdens the entire system and draws re­
sources away from meritorious cases. W ithout 
sufficient resources to devote to the EEOC’s ever- 
burgeoning caseload, it is likely that some legiti­
mate claims— especially ones filed by employees 
with legitimate claims but who are not repre­
sented by attorneys— may slip through the cracks. 
The unfortunate result is that both employees 
and employers become cynical toward the sys­
tem. This is a logical result when em­
ployees make legitimate claims that are 
not adequately redressed and employ­
ers who diligently comply with the 
federal and state discrimination laws 
are extorted.
The current system for resolving 
discrimination claims results in a sys­
tem that provides perverse incentives 
for employees and employers with intent to de­
ceive. W ith workloads continuing to increase at 
the same time that budgets remain relatively 
fixed, agencies are compelled to resolve claims in 
a more efficient manner by attempting to induce 
parties to settle.13 But when settlement becomes 
the overwhelming goal, the merits of each indi­
vidual case tend to lose their significance, thereby 
creating an opportunity and incentive for em­
ployees to file frivolous claims. Employers, in 
turn, have an incentive to settle claims, even if 
they are frivolous, because of the high costs of 
the agencies’ investigations and the even more- 
exorbitant costs of prospective litigation.
Responding to an agency’s investigation may 
cost an employer, depending on the complexity 
and location of the case, between $2,500 and 
$10,000.14 Litigating a case through trial costs 
the employer at least $50,000 and could exceed 
$500,000.15 In most cases, the available damages 
are a fraction of the costs o f defense, and there is
13 Sherwyn etal., “M andatory A rbitration,” supra note 4, at 
80-82.
14 Telephone interviews w ith David Ritter, chair o f the 
L abor and E m ploym ent D ep artm en t a t the law firm  
o f Altheimer &  Grey, in Chicago, IL; and Peter Albrecht, 
partner at the law firm o f Godfrey & Kahn, in Madison, 
W isconsin (March 12, 1998).
15 Sherwyn et al., “M andatory A rbitration,” supra note 4,
at 82.
always the possibility of losing at trial. Defense 
lawyers believe that juries are unpredictable and 
fear that they are inclined to award large sums of 
money to the plaintiff in damages and attorneys’ 
fees that they may not deserve.16
“Bad actors” exploit the economic realities of 
the current system by using the costs of litiga­
tion to their benefit. Employers will have greater 
incentive to settle as long as the settlement fig­
ure is less than what it would cost to successfully 
defend a case before the EEOC or in federal or
state court. The result is what appears as a sys­
tem of litigation extortion that can be euphemis­
tically referred to as “defacto severance.”17 All the 
while, employees with legitimate claims may be 
forced to accept settlement offers representing but 
a small fraction of the real value of their cases 
because they cannot afford the time and money 
it takes to litigate.
Mediation. Instead of addressing the problems 
relating to litigation, the EEOC and others have 
sidestepped the issue by promoting mediation to 
resolve disputes. Mediation has great appeal be­
cause it is not, by definition, adversarial. Instead,
16 By means o f an anecdotal illustration, a team o f defense 
lawyers conducted a mock jury trial before the actual trial 
of a case brought by a plaintiff who was diagnosed as a patho­
logical liar by the defense-side s psychologist. Plaintiff had 
no supporting facts or witnesses to bolster her allegations 
o f sexual harassment levied against a supervisor. Some of 
the mock-trial jurors awarded the plaintiff some damages 
not because they believed that she was sexually harassed, 
but rather because they felt sorry for her. Unbeknownst to 
the mock jury, awarding her even a modest sum may trig­
ger a potentially exorbitant award o f attorneys’ fees. Suffice 
it to say that the frightening and somewhat surreal mock- 
jury experience convinced the employer to settle the case.
17 Sherwyn etal., “M andatory A rbitration,” supra note 4, at 
82 (defining “de facto severance” as a process whereby em­
ployees file baseless discrim ination charges because they 
know that their former employers are willing to pay a nom i­
nal am ount o f money to avoid the aggravation, costs, and 
losses o f time, resources, and productivity that inevitably 
arise in defending such allegations).
When settlement becomes the over­
whelming goal, the merits of each in­
dividual case lose their significance, 
thereby creating an incentive for em­
ployees to file frivolous claims....
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the parties, in theory, work together to come to 
mutually acceptable resolutions. While the theory 
of mediation is appealing, the reality leaves much 
to be desired.
In EEOC-sponsored mediations, the media­
tors do not examine the merits of the cases. In­
stead, the mediators simply attempt to reach a 
settlement. Another way to describe this situa­
tion is to simply ask: what will the employer pay 
and what will the employee accept to walk away? 
Inevitably, such a system results in employees
extorting innocent employers and guilty employ­
ers exploiting employees who have suffered dis­
crimination but are unable to obtain competent 
counsel.
Mediation does not resolve the issues associ­
ated with employment discrimination. Instead, 
it exacerbates the problems by institutionalizing 
de facto severance. Still, it does make sense to 
examine alternative methods to resolve disputes 
(rather than working through the courts). Such 
a system must provide a low-cost adjudication 
forum that discourages both employer discrimi­
nation and employee extortion. Mandatory ar­
bitration may be the answer.
The Arbitration Alternative
Arbitrators adjudicate cases in a fraction of the 
time and for significantly less cost than when the 
parties go into litigation.18 W ith arbitration, well- 
meaning employers would no longer be extorted 
into hasty settlements by the high costs of litiga­
18 Compare: Ted Eisenberg and Elizabeth Hill, “Employ­
m ent Arbitration and Litigation: An Empirical Com pari­
son” (a working paper on file with the author) with Kathryn 
Van Wezel Stone, “M andatory Arbitration of Individual Em­
ploym ent Rights: T he Yellow D og C ontract o f the 1990s,” 
73 Denv. U. L. Rev. 1017, 1039 (1996) (noting that the 
arb itra to r’s fees could easily exceed $1,000). See also: 
Sherwyn et al., “M andatory A rbitration,” supra note 4, at
132-133 (arguing that $1,000 may be a paltry sum in com­
parison to the legal fees accrued during litigation).
tion, while truly wronged employees would not 
face unattainable barriers to receiving the dam­
ages to which they are entitled. Conversely, 
damage-seeking employees will be unable to lever­
age de facto severance payments and will receive litde 
or nothing at all. Moreover, employers with bad 
intentions will be unable to force a plaintiff— 
employee to accept an otherwise less-than-deserved 
setdement. Instead, such employers will likely pay 
full damages (or closer to full damages than in 
some other settlement). Therefore, in compari­
son to alternative forms of dispute reso­
lution, like mediation, and in compari­
son w ith  trad itio n a l litig a tio n , 
arbitration offers the parties savings in 
costs and time as well as incentives that 
may actually hinder discrimination 
and harassment in the workplace.
Mandatory arbitration’s advantages 
have compelled many employers to 
implement lawful mandatory-arbitration pro­
grams. Such programs are an effective means for 
employers to pool the risk of liability for being 
sued for unfounded claims and to resolve sub­
stantiated claims without fear of financial ruin 
or incurring bad publicity. Certainly, many em­
ployers in the United States that have already 
implemented such programs believe that the ben­
efits of such risk-pooling far outweigh the disad­
vantages of mandatory arbitration (chiefly, that 
arbitrators’ decisions cannot usually be appealed, 
and the lack of a guarantee that the arbitrator 
selected will fully understand the applicable 
laws).19
There are some, however, who argue that ar­
bitration is not a suitable forum for resolving 
employment disputes. Many of these arguments 
are based on social policies that are beyond the 
scope of this article. The remaining arguments, 
which are addressed and confronted below, ques­
tion the legality of mandatory arbitration pursu­
ant to federal and state law.
19 The American Arbitration Association (AAA) reports that 
more than 700 employers have m andatory-arbitration sys­
tems under which the AAA is designated as the agency to 
adm inister the program. T hat information was presented 
by the general counsel at a research conference on domestic 
and international arbitration sponsored by the Institute o f 
Judicial Administration, at NYU Law School, September 
20 , 2002.
...Employers, in turn, have an incentive 
to settle claims, even if they are frivo­
lous, because of the high costs of the 
agencies' investigations and the ex­
orbitant costs of prospective litigation.
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The Law of Mandatory Arbitration
The lawfulness of arbitration of disputes arising 
out of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
(as amended),20 the Age Discrimination in Em­
ployment Act (ADEA),21 and the Americans with 
Disabilities Act (ADA)22 has been the subject of 
at least five U.S. Supreme Court cases,23 as well 
as countless circuit-court opinions, district-court 
opinions, and law-review articles.24 For the most 
part, the debate has focused on four areas: (1) 
the role of the EEOC, (2) whether the Federal 
Arbitration Act (FAA) applies to employment 
contracts, (3) what constitutes a “fair” arbitra­
tion agreement, and (4) the effect of Section 118 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1991.
Now, after ten years of debate,25 the first two 
issues have been resolved. Alternatively, the lat­
ter two issues remain unsettled despite the fact 
that there is a substantial amount of judicial au­
thority on these topics. The section below ex­
plains the development of the law concerning 
each of those issues.
The Change in the Law
Prior to 1991 lawyers, judges, and scholars gen­
erally accepted that mandatory-arbitration agree­
ments were unenforceable with regard to cases 
filed under federal anti-discrimination statutes.26 
That position was based on Alexander v. Gardner- 
Denver Co?1 In that case, the U.S. Supreme Court 
held that an employee could proceed with a Title 
VII claim even after she suffered an adverse deci­
sion in a labor-arbitration award handed down 
pursuant to a collective-bargaining agreement.28 
The lower courts extended this holding to the 
nonunion setting and, thus, for some years it 
seemed clear that mandatory-arbitration agree­
ments were unenforceable.29 The court left open 
several questions, however. Two o f the most- 
debated issues concerned the role of the EEOC 
and the scope and applicability o f the FAA. The 
Court finally resolved these issues in its EEOC v. 
Waffle House and Circuit City v. Adams decisions.
The Role of the EEOC
As explained above, employees must file charges 
of discrimination with the EEOC before filing 
lawsuits in federal court. After its investigation, 
the EEOC can attempt to settle the case, issue a 
right-to-sue letter, or sue on behalf of the plain­
tiff. The advent of pre-dispute mandatory arbi­
tration has led to these three questions: (1) Can
20 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000el7  (1994).
21 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1994).
22 42 U.S.C. §§12101-12134 (1994).
23 See: Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974); Gilmer v. Johnson-Interstate Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991); 
Wright v. Universal M aritime Service Corp., et. a l ,  525 U.S. 70 (1998); Circuit City v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001); 
and EEO C v. Waffle House, Inc., 121 S. Ct. 1401 (2001) (cert, granted).
24 See, for example: Samuel Estreicher, 16 Ohio St. J. on Disp. Resol. 559 (2001); Delphene H ardin, “Sacrificing Statutory 
Rights on the Altar o f Pre-dispute Employment Agreements M andating A rbitration,” 28 Cap. U.L. Rev. 455 (2000); 
Richard A. Bales, “Compulsory Employment Arbitration and the EEO C ,” 27 Pepp. L. Rev. 1 (1999); and Samuel Estreicher, 
“Predispute Agreements to A rbitrate Statutory Em ployment Claims,” 72 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1344 (1997).
25 Sherwyn et al., “M andatory A rbitration,” supra note 4, at n. 16. See also: David Sherwyn, “Because It Takes Two: W hy 
Post-dispute Voluntary Arbitration Programs W ill Fail to Fix the Problems Associated with Employee Discrimination- 
law A rbitration,” forthcoming, Berkeley Journal o f  Employment andCLabor Law.
26 See: Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 47 (1-974) (“There is no suggestion in [Title VII] that a prior 
arbitral decision either forecloses an individual’s right to sue or divests federal courts o f jurisdiction.”); Utley v. Goldman 
Sachs &  Co., 883 F.2d 184, 187 (1st Cir. 1989) (holding that Title VII claims are nonarbitrable in nonunion employment 
setting); and Swenson v. Management Recruiters In t’l, Inc., 872 F.2d 264 (8th Cir. 1989) (distinguishing commercial from 
civil rights disputes in terms o f m andatory arbitration).
27 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
28 Id. at 59-60  (noting that “the federal policy-favoring arbitration o f labor disputes and the federal policy against 
discrim inatory employment practices can best be accommodated by perm itting an employee to pursue fully both his 
remedy under the grievance-arbitration clause o f a collective-bargaining agreement and his cause o f action under T itle
V II”).
29 See, for example: McDonald v. City o f  West Branch, Michigan, 466 U.S. 284 (1984).
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the employees still file claims with the EEOC?, 
(2) Can the EEOC still file lawsuits on behalf of 
employees?, and (3) If so, may the agency seek 
money damages, or is it limited to seeking in­
junctive relief?
The first question was definitively answered 
by the Gilmer court, which stated: “An individual 
ADEA claimant subject to an arbitration agree­
ment will still be free to file a charge with the 
EEOC, even though the claimant is not able to 
institute a private judicial action. Indeed, Gilmer 
filed a charge with the EEOC in this case.”30 The 
U.S. Supreme Court answered the second ques­
tion when, in response to Gilmers contention that 
arbitration was an inappropriate forum for class 
actions and equitable relief, it stated: “arbitration 
agreements will not preclude the EEOC from 
bringing actions seeking class-wide and equitable 
relief.”31 Refuting this argument did not, how­
ever, end the controversy regarding the role of 
the EEOC. Instead, it created the third question. 
In EEOC v. Kidder, Peabody &  Co.32 and Merrill, 
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner and Smith, Inc. v. Nixon13 
the Second and Eighth Circuits, relying on 
Gilmer, held that the EEOC could seek injunc­
tive relief only. In contrast, in EEOC v. Franks 
Nursery, Inc.,34 the Court of Appeals for the Sixth 
Circuit held that an arbitration agreement does 
not prevent the EEOC from pursuing an action 
for m onetary damages. In EEO C  v. Waffle 
House,35 the U.S. Supreme Court resolved the 
question.
In Waffle House the court held that the EEOC 
has the right to seek monetary relief for the plain­
tiffs on whose behalf it sued, and based its hold­
ing on two grounds: (1) Gilmer did not limit the 
EEOC to seeking injunctive relief, it just stated 
that the EEOC could pursue such cases; and 
(2) limiting the EEOC to injunctive relief has 
no support in statutory law or public policy. 
Under the law, the EEOC has the right to en­
30 Id. at 28.
31 Id. at 32.
32 156 F.3d 298 (2nd Cir. 1998)
33 210 F.3d 814 (8th Cir. 2000).
34 177 F.2d 448 (6th Cir. 1999).
35 122 S. Ct. 754 (2002).
force the discrimination laws. One method of 
such enforcement is through litigation. If a court 
held that the EEOC could not sue for monetary 
damages, that holding would impair the agency’s 
ability to enforce the law— given that most vio­
lations are settled by monetary payments. It is 
unlikely that employees who believe that they 
have been discrim inated against w ould go 
through the pains of litigation just so that the 
EEOC could get an order preventing the em­
ployer from engaging in such conduct. Thus, 
preventing the EEOC from pursuing money 
damages would essentially allow an employer and 
employee to contract away the EEOC’s right and 
obligation to enforce the law.
Although Waffle House represents a significant 
legal holding and resolved an important open 
question, the popular press has treated this hold­
ing as if it had much greater practical effect on 
employers than it actually does. In fact, the hold­
ing will have little or no effect on the vast major­
ity of employers because the EEOC litigates a 
minuscule fraction o f the discrimination charges 
it receives. For example, in the year 2000, the 
EEOC received just under 80,000 discrimina­
tion charges and filed lawsuits in only 291 cases 
(that’s less than one-third of one percent of those 
filed). In that same year, private plaintiffs filed 
21,032 cases. Thus, the EEOC accounted for less 
than 2 percent of all federal-court cases.36
Further, the cases litigated by the EEOC are 
not the type that mandatory arbitration was de­
signed to address. Employers enact mandatory- 
arbitration policies to avoid the incentive for 
employees to file frivolous claims that lead em­
ployers to pay de facto severance. The Waffle House 
ruling will have no effect on those types of situa­
tions because the E E O C  does no t litigate 
garden-variety cases. Instead, the EEOC only 
litigates cases that involve a novel or unsettled 
area of law, or a class action. Those are the types 
of cases that belong in court because it is neces­
sary for courts, not arbitrators, to develop the 
law by providing precedent for employers, em­
ployees, and arbitrators to follow.
36 See: Waffle House, supra fn. 47.
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eign or interstate commerce” of Section 1 of the 
FAA referred to all employees or to only those in 
the transportation industry.41 In Circuit City v. 
Adams the court held that the FAA’s exception 
was limited to the transportation industry and 
that arbitration agreements in employment con­
tracts were enforceable in other industries.42
The Circuit City decision received a fair share 
of publicity and rekindled the debate on arbitra­
tion. The decision’s legal effect was limited, how­
ever, because it simply confirmed the current state 
of the law in nine of the twelve circuits.43 More­
over, despite the Supreme Court’s holding, the 
N inth Circuit, on remand, still refused to com­
pel arbitration.
W hen the Ninth Circuit took up that case 
again, in what is being referred to as Circuit City 
7/,44 the court again refused to compel arbitra­
tion. This time the N inth Circuit, relying on 
California contract law, held that the contract 
was unenforceable because it was both procedur­
ally and substantively unconscionable. The court
37K ulukundi’s Shipping Co. v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 126 F. 2d 978, 982-85 (2nd Cir. 1942) (offering an account of 
historical and judicial attitudes towards enforcement o f arbitration agreements).
38Gilmer; 500 U.S. at 25, citing Moses H. Cone M em ’l Hasp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983); see: supra 
note 5.
35 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1994). The statute in its entirety provides: “M aritime transactions,” as herein defined, mean charter 
parties, bills o f lading o f water carriers, agreements relating to wharfage, supplies furnished vessels or repairs to vessels, 
collisions, or any other matters in foreign commerce which, if  the subject o f controversy, would be embraced within 
admiralty jurisdiction; “commerce,” as herein defined, means commerce among the several States or with foreign nations, 
or in any Territory o f the U nited States or in the District o f Columbia, or between any such Territory and another, or 
between any such Territory and any State or foreign nation, or between the District o f Columbia and any State or 
Territory or foreign nation, but nothing herein contained shall apply to contracts o f employment o f seamen, railroad 
employees, or any other class o f workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce.
40 Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 25 n. 2. This m inor detail spawned hundreds o f lawsuits over the past decade and cost litigants 
millions o f dollars.
41 See: id. at 25 n. 2. The court noted: Section 1 o f the FAA provides that “nothing herein contained shall apply to 
contracts o f employment o f seamen, railroad employees, or any other class o f workers engaged in foreign or interstate 
commerce.” 9 U.S.C. §1. Several amici curiae in support o f Gilmer argue that that section excludes from the coverage of 
the FAA all “contracts o f em ploym ent.” Gilmer, however, did not raise the issue in the courts below; it was not addressed 
there; and it was not among the questions presented in the petition for certiorari. In any event, it would be inappropriate 
to address the scope o f the § 1 exclusion because the arbitration clause being enforced here is not contained in a contract 
o f employment. The FAA requires that the arbitration clause being enforced be in writing. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 2, 3. The 
record before us does not show, and the parties do not contend, that Gilmer’s employment agreement with Interstate 
contained a written arbitration clause. Rather, the arbitration clause at issue is in Gilmer’s securities registration applica­
tion, which is a contract with the securities exchanges, not with Interstate. T he lower courts addressing the issue uni­
formly have concluded that the exclusionary clause in § 1 o f the FAA is inapplicable to arbitration clauses contained in 
such registration applications (citations omitted). Unlike the dissent (citation omitted), we choose to follow the plain 
language o f the FAA and the weight o f authority, and we therefore hold that § I s exclusionary clause does not apply to 
G ilmer’s arbitration agreement. Consequently, we leave for another day the issue raised by amici curiae.
42 Circuit City v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001).
43 Two Circuits had not ruled on the issue while the N inth  Circuit was an outlier.
44 Circuit City Stores, Inc., v. Adams, 279 F.3rd 889 (9th Cir. 2002). Hereafter, “Circuit City II .”
The Federal Arbitration Act 
At the time of the enactment of the FAA in 1925, 
courts generally mistrusted arbitration as an ad­
judicative process and often refused to enforce 
parties’ agreements to arbitrate in a variety of set­
tings.37 Congress enacted the FAA to statutorily 
remedy that mistrust. In the broadest and most 
simple terms, the FAA reflects a “liberal federal 
policy favoring arbitration agreements.”38 Section 
1 of the FAA, however, excludes from the act’s 
coverage “contracts of employment of seamen, 
railroad employees, or any other class of workers 
engaged in foreign or interstate commerce.”39 In 
Gilmer, the arbitration agreement at issue was 
held not to be an employment contract because 
the parties to the agreement were the New York 
Stock Exchange and Gilmer, not the “employer” 
and the “employee.”40 Because the agreement that 
plaintiff Gilmer signed was not a condition of 
employment imposed on him directly by his 
employer, the court elected not to address the 
question of whether the term “engaged in for-
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explained that it assesses procedural unconscio- 
nability by considering the “equilibrium between 
the parties and the extent to which the contract 
clearly discloses its terms.”45 The court then stated 
that it determined substantive unconscionabil- 
ity by deciding “whether the terms of the con­
tract are unduly harsh.”46 In Circuit City I I  the 
court held that the arbitration agreement was 
both procedurally and substantively unconscio­
nable. The section below both explains and criti­
cally examines the rationale behind the court’s 
determinations.
A bad deal. The key factor in the court’s de­
termination that the Circuit City agreement was 
procedurally unconscionable is the fact that the 
company offered the contract, as a condition of 
employment, on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. Ac­
cording to the court, because Circuit City had 
considerably more bargaining power than did its 
employees, and because the employees could not 
modify the agreement in any way, the agreement 
was a contract of adhesion and, thus, unconscio­
nable. The Circuit City I I  court also held that 
the arbitration agreement itself was substantively 
unconscionable. The agreement did, in fact, have 
a number of problems. Specifically, the agree­
ment: (1) limited the available damages, (2) lim­
ited the statute of limitations, (3) required the 
employees to pay a portion of the arbitration fees, 
and— most tellingly (4) did not prevent the em­
ployer from bringing an action in court— yet it 
prevented employees from doing so.
The first two reasons for finding the Circuit 
City agreement unconscionable are both ratio­
nal and easy to correct. It simply makes no sense 
to allow employers and employees to sign away 
their rights to collect damages or to revise the 
statute of limitations. The reason for arbitration 
is to avoid the costs, delays, and perverse incen­
tives associated with litigation— but in so doing 
it should not take the teeth out of the law. Re­
ducing the damages and revising the statute of 
limitations does, indeed, take the teeth out of the 
law by making it difficult and less desirable for 
employees to pursue their claims under the law.
The third issue— who pays the cost of arbi­
tration?— is more complex, but still easy to cor­
rect. The issue is complicated because some com­
mentators have raised concerns that arbitrators 
may be corrupted if the employer pays the entire 
cost. To support this argument, commentators 
focus on the fact that employers will often con­
tract with the American Arbitration Association 
or another alternative-dispute-resolution (ADR) 
provider. The argument is that such organizations 
will be reluctant to find against the employer if 
it is paying the full cost. Yet that argument fails 
for two reasons. First, ADR providers simply cre-
The reason for arbitration is to avoid the 
costs, delays, and perverse incentives asso­
ciated w ith litigation— but in so doing it 
should not take the teeth out of the law.
ate a panel of arbitrators from which the lawyers 
on each side choose. A plaintiff’s lawyer will never 
choose an arbitrator who is influenced by the fact 
that the employer is paying the entire cost. Sec­
ond, the ADR organization does not care who 
pays, as long as the employer contracts with that 
organization. Thus, if the organization really is 
corrupt, it will support its client, the employer, 
regardless of who pays. Accordingly, if courts 
want to protect employees from corrupt ADRs,47 
then the courts need to prohibit employers from 
contracting with just one or two organizations 
and, instead, require that arbitration agree­
ments allow multiple ADR organizations to sub­
mit panels to the parties. I could find no case 
that requires such a clause. Moreover, that re­
search did not uncover any case where a court 
refused to enforce an arbitration agreement be­
cause the employer agreed to pay the entire cost 
of arbitration.
Conversely, there are a number of cases where 
courts denied a motion to compel arbitration 
because the employee had to pay the costs. In 
one of the lead cases on this issue, Cole v. Burns 
Intern. Sec. Services,48 the court found it to be
45 Id. 
“ Id.
47 There is no evidence to support the proposition that any 
o f the organizations are corrupt or that employees need pro­
tection from them.
48 1 05 F.3d. 1465 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
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“unreasonable” for the employee to share the cost 
of the arbitrator that could be as much as $ 1,000 
per day. The court did not, however, refuse to 
compel arbitration. Instead, it simply “blue pen­
ciled”49 the agreement by shifting all the costs to 
the employer. The majority of courts have not, 
however, followed such a procedure. Instead, 
most courts will enforce an arbitration agreement 
even if it forces the employee to pay some por­
tion of the adjudication-process cost.50 For em­
ployers, the cost issue is easy to sum up: (1) en­
sure the enforceability by paying all costs, or 
(2) require employees to share in costs and hope 
the court will uphold the agreement. Indeed, in 
most cases the court will.
Failed mutuality. The fourth issue raised by 
Circuit City I I  was that, under the agreement, 
employees could not litigate disputes with the 
employer in court, but employers could bring a 
court action against its employees. This lack of 
mutuality is the basis on which a number of 
courts refuse to compel arbitration.51 On its face, 
requiring mutuality makes sense. W hy should an 
employer be allowed to use the courts while an 
employee cannot? One answer is that the two 
sides pursue different claims that provide differ­
ent types of relief. Employees pursue discrimi­
nation, contract, and tort claims to obtain back 
pay, reinstatement, attorney’s fees, and punitive 
and compensatory damages. Arbitrators can 
award those types of damages. Employers’ claims, 
however, often consist of enforcing non-compe­
tition or trade-secret agreements. In those cases, 
the employer needs a court to immediately grant 
an injunction to prevent the employee from caus­
ing irreparable harm by violating such an agree­
ment. Arbitration is not designed to provide 
such immediate relief. If courts insist on m utu­
ality, arbitration may be inappropriate for em­
ployers that need to enforce trade-secret or non­
competition agreements.
49 A court “blue pencils” a contract when it deletes or alters 
the objectionable clause and then enforces the contract.
50 Michael H . LeRoy and Peter Feuille, “The Evergreen Tree 
o f Compulsory Arbitration? W here Cost is an Unlawful 
Barrier to Private Dispute Resolution” (forthcoming, UCLA 
Law Review).
51 The court based its conclusions on Armendariz v. Foun­
dation H ealth Pyschcare Services, Inc., 24 C al. 4 lh 83
(Cal. 2000).
Circuit City I I  is a difficult case to interpret 
because the court’s ruling criticizes the company’s 
arbitration agreement for at least five different 
reasons and then does not state which of those 
reasons are determinative. In other words, the 
court failed to state whether it would have en­
forced the agreement if any of the issues it iden­
tified had been addressed satisfactorily. Two 
months later, however, the Ninth Circuit did pro­
vide some guidance when it enforced an arbitra­
tion agreement in Circuit City Stores v. Ahmed.52 
In this case the court held that the agreement 
was not “procedurally unconscionable” because 
the company did not “require” the employee to 
sign the pre-dispute agreement. Instead, the em­
ployee could opt out of the arbitration program 
during the first 30 days of employment. Employ­
ees who did not opt out were covered by the 
policy. Unfortunately, this opinion does not state 
whether this particular Circuit City arbitration 
agreement mirrored the one at issue in Circuit 
City II. According to those familiar with the case 
and subsequent Ninth Circuit cases, however, the 
agreements in Ahmed and Circuit City I I  were 
substantially the same. Thus, the N inth Circuit 
held that a substantively unconscionable agree­
ment is enforceable as long as it is not procedur­
ally unconscionable. The Ninth Circuit affirmed 
and clarified this holding three months later in 
Circuit City v. Najd.53 In N a jd the N inth Circuit 
stated that the agreements in Circuit City I I  and 
Ahmed (and presumably Najd) were “materially 
identical.” Thus, the Ninth Circuit’s holding is 
clear: substantively unconscionable agreements are 
enforceable as long as they are not procedurally 
unconscionable. That is, employees may choose 
to agree to an “unfair” arbitration agreement like 
the one at issue in Circuit City II, but they cannot 
be forced into such an inequitable agreement.
Section 118 of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1991
Section 118 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 states: 
“[w] here appropriate and to the extent autho­
rized by law, the use of alternative dispute reso­
lution including...arbitration, is encouraged to
52 283 F.3d 1198 (9th Cir. 2002).
53 294 F.3d. 1104 (9,h Cir. 2002).
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resolve disputes arising under [Title VII and the 
ADA] .”54 In Duffield the N inth Circuit held that 
this language evidenced a congressional intent 
to prohibit mandatory arbitration and thus arbi­
tration agreements did not preclude an employee 
from filing a Title VII or ADA discrimination 
lawsuit in federal court (Section 118 is mirrored 
in the ADA).55 Every other circuit to rule on this 
issue rejected this position.56 O n September 3, 
2002, the Ninth Circuit settled the Duffield ques­
tion , for now. In  E EO C  v. Luce, Forward, 
Hamilton &  Scripps57 a panel o f three N inth Cir­
cuit judges held that after Circuit City, Duffield 
was no longer good law. Thus, district courts in 
the N inth Circuit can no longer refuse to com­
pel arbitration based on Section 118 of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1991. This does not mean, of 
course, that the issue is resolved once and for all. 
The EEOC will ask either: (1) the entire set 
of N inth Circuit judges to review the case, or 
(2) the U.S. Supreme Court to resolve the issue. 
If both the Ninth Circuit and the Supreme Court 
refuse the request, the issue will be over. If either 
one accepts the case, there will be more litiga­
tion. For now, however, the Section 118 issue is 
resolved.
The Law of the Ninth Circuit
Under the Ahmed and Najd  holdings, unconscio­
nable pre-dispute agreements are enforceable so 
long as they are not offered on a take-it-or-leave- 
it basis. Employee-rights advocates should be con­
cerned about those decisions. Enforcing a sub­
stantively unconscionable pre-dispute arbitration 
agreement simply because signing it was optional 
at the time o f hire is, put simply, bad law. Profes­
sor Sam Estreicher contends that the beginning 
of an employment relationship is similar to the
beginning of a love affair between two people. 
Both sides, according to Estreicher, want this re­
lationship to last, neither anticipates any prob­
lems, and both are willing to make seemingly 
small sacrifices to get the relationship off on the 
right foot. Accordingly, Estreicher predicts that 
most employees will sign anything at the time of 
hire.58 Employers therefore have a perverse in­
centive to create unfair, one-sided agreements
Enforcing a substantively unconscion­
able pre-dispute arbitration agree­
ment simply because signing it was 
optional at the time of hire is, put 
simply, bad law.
54 Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 118,105 Stat. 1071,1081 (1991) 
(codified in scattered sections o f 2 U .S.C., 29 U.S.C. and 
42 U.S.C.).
55 144 F.3d 1182, 1185 (9th Cir. 1998).
56 See: Rosenberg v. M errill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &  Smith, 
Inc., 170 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1999); Desiderio v. NASD , 191 
F.3d 198 (2nd Cir. 1999); Seus v. John Nuveen &  Co., 146 
F.3d 175 (3rd Cir. 1998); Hooters o f  America, Inc. v. Philips, 
173 F.3d 933 (4th Cir. 1999); Mouton v. Metropolitan Life 
Ins. Co., 147 F.3d453 (5th Cir. 1998); a n d Koveleski v. SBC  
Capital Markets, Inc., 167 F.3d 361 (7 th  Cir. 1999).
57 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 18043 (N inth  Cir. 2002).
with opt-out provisions. Such agreements: (1) will 
satisfy the Ninth Circuit s standards, and (2) bind 
employees because it is unlikely that new hires 
will assertively opt out of such agreements (nei­
ther Najd nor Ahmed opted out, for example).
In addition to creating a perverse incentive, 
those holdings invite a question. The question 
can be framed as follows: If courts will enforce a 
substantively unconscionable agreement as long 
as it is not procedurally unconscionable, will the 
courts enforce a procedurally unconscionable 
agreement as long as it is not substantively un­
conscionable? In other words, can a take-it-or- 
leave-it offer (which the N inth Circuit deemed 
procedurally unconscionable) be enforceable if 
the agreement is not substantively unconscio­
nable? Based on how the Ahmed and Najd  courts 
applied Circuit City I fs  holding that: “Under 
California law, a contract is unenforceable if both 
procedurally  and  substantively unconscio­
nable,”59 it seems clear that an agreement might 
be enforceable if it is procedurally or substan­
tively unconscionable, but not if it is procedur-
58 Professor Estreicher made those comments at the first 
annual Hospitality Industry Labor and Em ployment Law 
Round Table, held at Cornell University’s School o f Hotel 
Adm inistration and sponsored by the Center for H ospital­
ity Research (May 5 -6 , 2002).
59 Circuit City I I at 893 (emphasis added).
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ally rzWsubstantively unconscionable. Thus, em­
ployers can require employees to sign arbitration 
agreements so long as the agreements are “fair,” 
or enforce unfair agreements so long as the em­
ployees can opt out.
The Meaning of “Fair”
Outside of the Ninth Circuit the general rule is 
that mandatory arbitration agreements are legal 
as long as they are “fair.” Despite the fact that 
neither the U.S. Congress nor the Supreme Court 
has defined what constitutes a “fair” arbitration 
agreement, and despite the fact that there are 
those of the mind that there is no such thing as a 
“fair” arbitration agreement, enough authority 
exists on the issue to propose some reliable and 
comprehensive guidelines. In examining fairness, 
Gilmer and its progeny focus on the following 
seven issues: (1) who pays the costs of arbitra­
tion, (2) the procedures for selecting the arbitra­
tor, (3) mutuality, (4) whether the employee en­
tered  in to  the  agreem ent know ingly and 
voluntarily, (5) available damages, (6) the method 
of delivering opinions, and (7) discovery.60 As 
discussed above, the Circuit City I I  court exam­
ined the first four issues and set standards for 
each. Those standards are not, however, the law 
outside of the N inth Circuit. Still, with respect 
to the first three issues, one can ensure enforce­
ability if the employer pays the entire cost o f the 
arbitration, both parties must have a substantial 
role in selecting the arbitrator, and both sides 
agree that arbitration will be the exclusive forum 
for both parties.
W ith respect to take-it-or-leave-it offers, only 
the Ninth Circuit holds such terms to be uncon­
scionable. In the rest of the country, arbitration 
agreements are enforceable so long as they clearly 
describe the terms of the agreement (e.g., the 
agreements must state that discrimination claims 
are covered and that the document being signed 
is a binding legal contract) and are not hidden in 
an employee handbook or some other long and
60 The Supreme C ourt in Gilmer reiterated the so-called 
savings clause o f § 2 o f the FAA (arbitration agreements are 
enforceable “save upon such grounds as exist at law or in 
equity for the revocation o f any contract”). See: Gilmer, 500 
U.S. at 33; and 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1994). The C ourt also stated 
that “[t]here is no indication in this case, however, that 
Gilmer, an experienced businessman, was coerced or de­
frauded into agreeing to the arbitration clause in his regis­
tration application.” Id.
intimidating document.61 This is the case even if 
the arbitration is offered on a take-it-or-leave-it 
basis.
There is conflicting authority on how (and 
whether) arbitration agreements may limit dam­
ages available to prevailing parties. Case law and 
a mass of scholarly work support the argument 
that arbitration agreements must permit an arbi­
trator to award the same damages that would be 
available to parties had they prevailed in court.62 
Alternatively, there are cases holding and others 
implying that arbitration agreements are enforce­
able even if they limit damages to less than what 
the prevailing parties might be entitled to had 
their case been heard in court.63 Last, arbitration 
agreements should provide for written opinions, 
and agreements must allow for at least some dis­
covery, even if it is limited.
W hat This Means for Employers
Mandatory arbitration is an effective way to re­
duce the costs of litigation. While the law is not 
completely settled, employers in almost all juris­
dictions can draft enforceable arbitration poli­
cies. Employers interested in pursuing such an 
option should contact counselors who have ex­
perience in drafting and litigating the enforce­
ability of arbitration agreements. M
61 See, for example: Trumbull v. Century Mktg. Corp., 12 F. 
Supp. 2d  683 (N .D . O h io  1988) (denying  enforce­
m ent where the arbitration-of-claims policy was found on 
less than two pages in the middle o f a 60-page employee 
handbook).
“ See, for example: Graham Oil Co. v. Arco Products Co., 4 3 
F.3d 1244 (9th Cir. 1994). Additionally, in accordance with 
the National Rules for the Resolution o f Employment Dis­
putes, the arbitrator may grant any remedy or relief that 
the arbitrator deems just and equitable, including any rem­
edy or relief that would be available to the parties had the 
matter been heard in court. This authority includes the right 
to award compensatory and exemplary (or punitive) dam ­
ages and other remedies to the extent those remedies would 
be available under applicable law in court. See also: JAMS, 
Policy on Employment Arbitration M inim um  Standards o f 
Procedural Fairness, at w w w .jam sadr.com /em ploym ent 
Arb_min_stds.asp#two (as viewed on November 11, 2001); 
Cole v. Burns In t’l  Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465 (D.C. Cir. 
1997); and Arm endanz v. Foundation Health Psychare Serv., 
Inc., 24 Cal. 4th 83, 103 (Cal. 2000).
63 See: Degaetano v. Smith Barney, Inc., 70 Fair Empl. Prac. 
Case. (BNA) 401 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 5, 1996) (upholding an 
arbitration agreement that prevented the arbitrators from 
awarding punitive damages or injunctive relief o f any kind); 
and Kinnebrew v. G u lf Insurance Co., 67 Fair Empl. Prac. 
Cas. (BNA) 189 (N .D . Tex. Nov. 28, 1994).
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